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Sentiment and Stock
Returns: Anticipating
a Major Sporting Event
Brian C. Payne1,2, Jiri Tresl3,4,
and Geoffrey C. Friesen5
Abstract
This study documents the effect of the Super Bowl on the stock returns of firms that
are geographically associated with the competing teams. We find significant upward
return drift in the 9 trading days leading up to the Super Bowl, a pattern consistent
with investors trading in anticipation of the game itself. The ‘‘anticipatory behavior’’
among investors leads to widespread pregame returns, which is not documented in
prior studies. These pre-event abnormal returns are positive and statistically and
economically significant for all firms, and the size of pre-event returns varies
according to each team’s favored status. In addition, firms associated with the
winning team exhibit significant positive return drift over the 10-day period after
their win. Firms associated with the losing team exhibit moderate downward drift.
Our findings are strongest among the smallest quintile of firms and are robust to
various risk adjustments and using a matched sample control group. The collective
findings suggest that only by standing on the sideline will investors avoid winning
around the Super Bowl.
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It’s ridiculous for a country to get all worked up about a game—except the Super Bowl, of
course. Now that’s important.
Andy Rooney, ‘‘Baseball haters—but good sports,’’ October 1, 1984, Chicago Tribune
You cannot engender such torrid anticipation for an event so great that it requires Roman
numerals as a suffix, then expect there to be no social repercussions at its end.
Robert Klein, ‘‘America’s Pastime: Selling the Big Game,’’ January 28, 1990, The New
York Times
Introduction and Motivation
Empirical research indicates that the performance of local sports teams affects the
safety, sentiment, and mood of the local community. Edmans, Garcia, and Norli
(2007) provide a comprehensive review of this literature that documents a connec-
tion between sporting events, stock returns, and a wide range of mood variables. Our
study tests the hypothesis that anticipation and mood affect stock returns in the days
leading up to the Super Bowl by examining the stock returns of firms that are
geographically associated with the competing teams. Using 42 Super Bowl games
between 1967 and 2010, we investigate the stock performance of firms headquar-
tered in the same state as professional football teams when their local team competes
in a Super Bowl championship.1 These criteria result in over 18,000 firm years—
10,412 winning firms and 8,191 losing firms—during the study period. We measure
both unadjusted returns and abnormal returns using a standard four-factor model.
Our focus is on the anticipatory behavior of investors prior to the sporting event,
and to our knowledge, this is the first study to document widespread systematic
presporting-event (i.e., anticipatory) return behavior.2 The Super Bowl lends itself to
analyzing anticipatory behavior because it is a rare sporting event that is important
enough to influence investor sentiment. It also occurs far enough after preceding
events (e.g., play-off games) that one can disentangle reaction from prior events
from anticipation of future events.3 To examine the anticipatory behavior of stock
prices we expand our time window to include the 9 trading days prior to the Super
Bowl. We also expand our postgame time window to test for the possibility of
postevent return drift, which may not be fully captured if the time window is
truncated only 1 or 3 days after the event, as most cited studies have done. This is
a wider time window, both before and after the Super Bowl, than most of the studies
in the literature.
Our study relates to several recent studies that examine the effect of sporting
events on mood and international stock returns. Edmans et al. (2007) identify a
significant loss effect in a country’s stock market index 1 day after the country’s
soccer team loses an international match, though they find no evidence of an analo-
gous winning effect. Palomino, Renneboog, and Zhang (2009) study returns over a
3-day window following British soccer matches and find that investors react
strongly to an expected win but find insignificant abnormal returns following
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expected losses. Bernile and Lyandres (2011) find that investors overestimate the
probability of a win in European soccer matches and are on average disappointed ex
post, which leads to negative average 1-day returns following the soccer match.
Two other related studies look at the relationship between sporting events and
stock returns in the United States. Chang, Chen, Chou, and Lin (2012) study 1-day
returns of local firms following National Football League (NFL) games. They doc-
ument that losers have lower next-day returns than winners and that the 1-day returns
are concentrated at the market open but not throughout the first trading day. Pant-
zalis and Park (2012) construct a local sports sentiment variable that represents the
success of local professional sports teams. They find a correlation between stock
performance and continuous, time-varying sentiment.
The first empirical contribution of our article is the documentation of significantly
positive unadjusted returns in local stocks prior to the Super Bowl. We present
unadjusted returns to provide a baseline of local firms’ performance relative to a
well-known market benchmark. The data show a viable trading strategy around the
Super Bowl involving a zero net investment portfolio consisting of a long (short)
position in all firms headquartered in competing teams’ states (the Standard and Poor’s
[S&P] 500 index). Such a strategy has yielded an average return of 3.01% over the
19 trading-day (i.e., 4 weeks) window surrounding the Super Bowl. Alternatively,
using odds makers’ information about whether the team was favored of nonfavored,
creating a portfolio long in favored (nonfavored) states’ firms and short in the S&P
500 yields an average return of 3.17 (2.84) % over the same period. Interestingly, a
team’s favored status forms the basis of a trading strategy that is slightly more
profitable than one based upon the actual (ex ante unknown) outcome of the game.
To determine whether these unadjusted returns are simply reward for bearing
risk, we then present abnormal returns based on a well-established four-factor
model. Abnormal returns are observed for the ex post winners and losers, as well
as ex ante favored and nonfavored teams. The eventual winning and favored teams
have slightly higher pregame returns than the nonfavored and eventual losing teams,
suggesting that investor trading has some ability to predict the outcome of the game.
This finding reconciles the apparently contradictory results of Palomino et al.
(2009)—that the release of pregame betting odds has little immediate impact on
stock prices—with Bernile and Lyandres (2011) who find that investors overesti-
mate the ex ante probability of winning. Bernile and Lyandres do not explicitly look
at pregame returns but conjecture that the observed negative 1-day return following
the game is the result of investors being, on average, ex ante optimistic and ex post
disappointed. We find that investors do in fact bid up the prices of both winners and
losers ex ante, but that this effect is gradual and may be missed if looking only for an
immediate price response the day betting odds are released. In addition, we observe
abnormal positive returns after the Super Bowl for winners. This is generally con-
sistent with the Palomino et al. (2009) finding that investors react to a strongly
expected win in British soccer matches, but not to a weakly expected win or an
expected loss.
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The finding that investor behavior depends upon a team’s favored status moti-
vates our next test. We recompute abnormal returns by splitting teams based on
their favored status, which to our knowledge is the first time this has been done in a
study of stock price anticipation or reaction to the Super Bowl. The pregame price
run-up is large for favored teams that win, which is consistent with the favored
status containing information about the eventual outcome. On the other hand, a
new result we document is that favored teams that lose have smaller pregame
returns, suggesting investors ‘‘know’’ correctly that these favored teams will likely
lose and therefore fail to bid up their prices. As for nonfavored teams, whether they
win or lose, they also experience significant abnormal increases in price leading up
to the Super Bowl. When we interact the actual outcome of the game with each
team’s favored status we find that postgame returns are quite insignificant except
when the favored team wins, in which case the postevent return is positive and
significant. These results corroborate those reported in Palomino et al. (2009), in
which investors react only to a strongly expected win. And like those authors, we
suggest that the observed asymmetry is difficult to reconcile with rational investor
behavior.
As robustness checks, we conduct a year-by-year matched sample analysis of
non-Super Bowl contending firms. The matched sample analysis supports the
finding of a significant anticipatory effect for Super Bowl contending firms. We
also analyze the results by dividing the firms in our sample into size quintiles, since
the largest firms also tend to have the highest institutional ownership (see Demsetz
& Lehn, 1985; Duggal & Millnar, 1999). We then rerun our analysis on separate
quintiles sorted by firm size. If our documented results are due to local investor
sentiment, the result will be strongest among the firms with highest local owner-
ship (e.g., smaller firms). We find that the results are statistically significant for
most size quintiles, but they are consistently most pronounced in the smallest size
quintile. These robustness checks are consistent with an investor sentiment
explanation.
Our study makes several contributions relative to the literature studying the
effect of sporting events on mood and stock prices. First, by examining preg-
ame returns, we demonstrate that returns not only respond to the outcome of the
Super Bowl but actually move in anticipation of the game itself. To our knowl-
edge, this is the first time such mood-based anticipatory behavior has been
documented. Second, we demonstrate that this pregame price movement some-
what reflects each team’s likelihood of winning. Lastly, we show that postgame
price movement is significant for a period of time, but only for favored teams
that win the game.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The second section motivates our
use of the Super Bowl as a laboratory for examining investor behavior. The third
section discusses the data. The fourth section presents our empirical methodology
and results. The fifth section concludes.
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Motivation
The hypotheses in our article are motivated by three connected empirical findings
that sporting events affect mood, that mood affects investor behavior, and that
investor behavior can affect stock prices. We are particularly interested in the inter-
play between mood and the ‘‘anticipation’’ of a future event. This section highlights
the literature on anticipation, mood, and their effect on stock prices.
Anticipation and Investor Mood
Many event studies document significant stock price changes in anticipation of an
actual event such as earnings announcements (Rendleman, Jones, & Latane, 1982)
and corporate takeovers (Keown & Pinkerton, 1981). In the context of our study, if a
sporting event such as the Super Bowl affects stock prices, it is plausible that stocks
prices may move in anticipation of the game itself. This is particularly so if investors
possess information about the likelihood of the game outcome (e.g., publicly avail-
able point spreads or some private information).
Peterson (2010) describes recent work in neuroeconomics, which has confirmed
that anticipatory brain activity affects investor mood and decision-making and has
shown that it is related to very specific neural pathways and brain systems. Spencer
(1880) describes the functions of the two major brain systems that can be generically
referred to as the reward (pleasure seeking) and loss-avoidance (pain-avoidance)
systems. Each system operates beneath conscious awareness and influences investor
behavior by way of judgment, information processing, and choices made under
uncertainty.
The reward system is activated by the perception or anticipation of a future
reward. The anticipated future event sets the brain system in motion, with neurons
carrying information using the neurotransmitter dopamine, which has been show to
affect mood, behavior, and attention. This information is carried through the meso-
limbic pathway that includes the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), medial prefrontal
cortex, and anterior cingulate gyrus (Bozarth, 1994). The loss-avoidance system is
somewhat less well defined and though runs through amygdala and anterior insula.
Activation is associated with feelings of anxiety, disgust, pain, panic, and stress.
DeMartino, Kumaran, Hold, and Dolan (2006) show that the behavioral bias of loss
aversion is related to amygdala activation.
Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) show that NAcc activation precedes both risky
choices and risk-seeking mistakes and often predicts irrational choices and behavior.
Interior insula activation, on the other hand, precedes riskless decisions and risk-
aversion mistakes. Thus, risk-seeking choices are driven by NAcc activation in
positive anticipatory states, whereas risk-avoiding choices are associated with acti-
vation of the amygdala or anterior insula due to anticipation of a negative future
event. Our fundamental hypothesis is that the 2-week period preceding the Super
Payne et al. 5
Bowl is a positive anticipatory state for local investors and therefore may be asso-
ciated with irrational choices and behavior.
Mood, Investor Behavior, and Stock Prices
Empirical research indicates that the performance of local sports teams affects the
safety, sentiment, and mood of the local community. Edmans et al. (2007) provide a
comprehensive review of this literature that documents a connection between sport-
ing events and a wide range of mood variables, all the way from overall optimism,
pessimism, and health to the specific number of homicides and suicides in a local
community.
In addition, it is well-documented that mood affects human behavior. Akerlof
and Shiller (2009) note that mood affects economic decisions and may affect stock
prices. Some explanations for this connection include mood-based changes in risk
aversion (Kliger & Levy, 2003) or investor misattribution (Lucey & Dowling,
2005). Regardless of the exact cause or explanation, the link between mood vari-
ables and stock market returns has been documented in numerous and diverse
contexts.4
Edmans et al. (2007, p. 1969) identify three necessary conditions that a mood
variable must satisfy in order to justify studying its link with stock returns:
First, the variable must drive mood in a substantial and unambiguous way, so that its effect
is powerful enough to show up in asset prices. Second, the variable must impact the mood
of a large proportion of the population, so that it is likely to affect enough investors. Third,
the effect must be correlated across the majority of individuals . . . .
We argue that the Super Bowl in the United States satisfies all three of these criteria.
First, the impact of winning versus losing is discrete and unambiguous. In addition,
anecdotal evidence suggests that the Super Bowl affects a large swath of the local
population in the same way. Consider the following report from the Denver Post on
February 9, 2016, regarding the Denver Broncos Super Bowl victory:
Basking in football euphoria and sunshine, a surge of orange-clad fans estimated at more
than 1 million poured into Civic Center and lined a downtown Denver parade route
Tuesday to celebrate the Broncos’ 24-10 Super Bowl 50 victory two days earlier over the
Carolina Panthers. Warm February temperatures and the fulfillment of championship
dreams brought Broncos Country together to revel in a singular success that had been
missing for 17 years.5
This singular event inspired nearly 20% of the entire population of the state of
Colorado (estimated to be 5,456,574 by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2015) to attend
the outdoor wintertime parade.
The final link between local investor sentiment and stock returns of local firms is
based upon the empirical fact that investors prefer to invest in local firms. Coval and
Moskowitz (1999) show that U.S. investment managers prefer to invest in firms
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headquartered close to home, while McQueen and Stenkrona (2012) document an
investor preference for familiar financial institutions, which they call the ‘‘home-
institution bias’’ (see also French & Poterba, 1991; Huberman, 2001; Ivkovic &
Weisbenner, 2005; Kalev, Nguyen, & Oh, 2008 for evidence that U.S. households
invest disproportionately in local firms). We follow the methodology of Giannetti
and Wang (2016) and proxy local firms by identifying all firms headquartered in the
same state as the competing Super Bowl team.
Characteristics of the Super Bowl
We focus exclusively on the Super Bowl for several reasons. First, prior studies (e.g.,
Edmans, Norli, & Garcia, 2007) find the postevent effect for sports events is stron-
gest for most important games. In the U.S. NFL, the Super Bowl is more important
than any other game, which includes key semifinal play-off games that occur 2 weeks
prior to the Super Bowl.
Second, of all major sports team championships (e.g., baseball, basketball,
and hockey) in the United States, the Super Bowl allows for the cleanest test of
pregame returns that are not contaminated by investor reaction to prior games.
This is because there are 2 full weeks (10 trading days) between the penultimate
play-off games and the Super Bowl, which allow for the reaction to the play-off
games to wane and anticipation of the Super Bowl to appear in returns. We note
here that even though there are 10 trading days between the play-off game and
the Super Bowl, most of our empirical work focuses on the 9 trading days prior
to the Super Bowl. We limit the window to 9 days to acknowledge the possi-
bility that the Super Bowl pre-event window may actually capture investor
reaction to the preceding play-off win. The empirical results of Chang et al.
(2012) indicate that the 1-day returns following a sporting event are concen-
trated at the market open and not throughout the first trading day, so we elim-
inate the first day of trading after the play-off game to remove the price impact
of the play-off game from our sample.
A third advantage of the Super Bowl is that it is a one-game championship. The
other candidate sports mentioned above use a best-of-seven championship series,
with games occurring in close proximity to each other—often every other day. This
rapid pace allows little time to disentangle reactive sentiment from the prior game
from anticipatory sentiment toward the next game. Additionally, for these types of
championship series, comparing the pre- and postchampionship-winning game
return behavior contains added noise. This noise results from the dynamic probabil-
ities of winning that evolve in a series that lasts between four and seven games over a
2-week period.
Finally, the Super Bowl occurs on a Sunday each year. As with Chang et al.
(2012), our postgame data therefore capture all market response at the open of the
Monday after the Super Bowl. No interday trading concerns occur as they could if
the championship were won during a weekday. Also, this method controls for any
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so-called Monday effect since Monday is day 0 for all firms contained in the
sample.6
Data
This study includes individual firms’ stock returns surrounding 42 Super Bowls
between the years 1967 and 2010. Daily stock returns for firms headquartered in
Super Bowl contenders’ states come from Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). We obtain Super Bowl details (i.e., dates, team hometowns, etc.) from
public Internet sources such as www.nfl.com.7 We exclude the years 1991 and
1995 since the winning and losing states are the same—NY and CA, respectively.
Table 1 shows the Super Bowl sample, detailing the winning and losing teams, the
favored and nonfavored teams, and the respective numbers of firms in winning and
losing states. The sample includes 18,603 firm years, with winning and losing firm
years, numbering 10,412 and 8,191, respectively. The Monday immediately after
Super Bowl Sunday represents day 0. Any intuition suggesting there are more
winning than losing sample firms because larger markets tend to win more often
generally holds, as the annual winning sample size is larger than the corresponding
losing sample size in 25 of the 42 years.
To discern any systematic differences among winning, losing, favored, and non-
favored subsamples, we also collect firm-level characteristics data from Compustat
North America. Each company must have a fully consolidated accounting statement
(CONSOL¼C), nonmissing close-to-close value-weighted average abnormal return
(AAR) during the study window, and nonmissing data for firm size (LOGSIZE), which
is the natural logarithm of the book value assets (TA) in millions of U.S. dollars. Table
2 shows the summary statistics for the sample. Panels A, B, C, and D show summary
statistics for the winning, losing, favored, and nonfavored teams’ firms, respectively.
While the sample size for each firm characteristic can vary due to data availability for
each firm, our sample for all subsequent analysis includes all 18,603 firm years.
It is important to note that there are various methods to determine ‘‘local’’ firms
(e.g., zip codes, radial distance from focal point). In this article, the geographical
connection is the state of the firms’ headquarters and the state of the professional
football team. This reflects the view and assumes that people associate themselves
with their state of residence.8 Geographical boundaries are used in similar studies
(e.g., Agarwal, Duchin, & Sosyura, 2013; Edmans et al., 2007; Giannetti & Wang,
2016; Kavetsos & Szymanski, 2010).
Overall, Table 1 shows that although winning states’ firms tend to come from
larger markets in terms of having more firms headquartered in these states, there is
no compelling evidence to suggest the winning and losing subsamples of firms
(Panels A and B) differ grossly from one another in their attributes. Since favored
(nonfavored) teams win (lose) more often than not, this subsample (Panels C and D)
tends to compare closely with winning (losing) firms.
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Table 1. Super Bowl Teams and Firms Headquartered in Winning and Losing Team States.
Year
Teams Winning/
Losing
Winning
Firms
Losing
Firms Year
Teams Winning/
Losing
Winning
Firms
Losing
Firms
1967 Green Bay
Packers/Kansas
City Chiefs
15 26 1988 Washington
Redskins/Denver
Broncos
16 149
1968 Green Bay
Packers/Oakland
Raiders
18 113 1989 San Francisco 49ers/
Cincinnati
Bengals
699 178
1969 NY Jets/Baltimore
Colts
214 20 1990 San Francisco
49ers/Denver
Broncos
676 141
1970 Kansas City Chiefs/
Minnesota Vikings
35 24 1992 Washington
Redskins/Buffalo
Bills
19 480
1971 Baltimore Colts/
Dallas Cowboys
20 125 1993 Dallas Cowboys/
Buffalo Bills
483 481
1972 Dallas Cowboys/
Miami Dolphins
135 61 1994 Dallas Cowboys/
Buffalo Bills
539 547
1973 Miami Dolphins/
Washington
Redskins
72 8 1996 Dallas Cowboys/
Pittsburgh
Steelers
578 283
1974 Miami Dolphins/
Minnesota
Vikings
113 74 1997 Green Bay Packers/
New England
Patriots
87 368
1975 Pittsburgh Steelers/
Minnesota
Vikings
181 80 1998 Denver Broncos/
Green Bay
Packers
172 83
1976 Pittsburgh
Steelers/Dallas
Cowboys
179 286 1999 Denver Broncos/
Atlanta Falcons
160 184
1977 Oakland Raiders/
Minnesota
Vikings
345 84 2000 St. Louis Rams/
Tennessee
Titans
97 84
1978 Dallas Cowboys/
Denver Broncos
302 70 2001 Baltimore Ravens/
NY Giants
109 509
1979 Pittsburgh
Steelers/Dallas
Cowboys
185 330 2002 New England
Patriots/St. Louis
Rams
285 88
1980 Pittsburgh
Steelers/Los
Angeles Rams
179 424 2003 TB Buccaneers/
Oakland Raiders
219 847
1981 Oakland Raiders/
Philadelphia
Eagles
441 178 2004 New England
Patriots/
Carolina
Panthers
239 100
(continued)
Payne et al. 9
Method and Results
Since we are testing the link between sport-induced sentiment and returns, our
specific methodology is to quantify and analyze the daily returns to firms head-
quartered in close geographical proximity to the teams competing in the Super Bowl
for approximately 2 weeks before and after the game. Using every Super Bowl
where contending teams are from different states, we select firms headquartered
in the same state as these competing teams. As a preliminary analysis, we look first
at unadjusted returns. Doing so provides a baseline for assessing the returns avail-
able to investors considering a local firm strategy. For comparative purposes, we
measure these unadjusted returns against the common U.S. market benchmark, the
S&P 500, over the same 4-week time period.
Since unadjusted returns fail to account for well-documented risk factors, the
bulk of this study focuses on risk-adjusted or abnormal returns for three reasons.
Table 1. (continued)
Year
Teams Winning/
Losing
Winning
Firms
Losing
Firms Year
Teams Winning/
Losing
Winning
Firms
Losing
Firms
1982 San Francisco 49ers/
Cincinnati
Bengals
480 177 2005 New England
Patriots/
Philadelphia
Eagles
233 225
1983 Washington
Redskins/Miami
Dolphins
17 189 2006 Pittsburgh
Steelers/Seattle
Seahawks
220 95
1984 Los Angeles
Raiders/
Washington
Redskins
567 16 2007 Indianapolis Colts/
Chicago Bears
66 183
1985 San Francisco
49ers/Miami
Dolphins
628 209 2008 NY Giants/New
England Patriots
418 228
1986 Chicago Bears/
New England
Patriots
210 203 2009 Pittsburgh Steelers/
Arizona
Cardinals
188 47
1987 NY Giants/Denver
Broncos
544 134 2010 New Orleans
Saints/
Indianapolis Colts
32 60
Total 10,412 8,191
Note. This table shows the list of National Football League teams playing in the Super Bowl between 1967
and 2010. It also shows the number of publicly traded firms headquartered in the winning (losing) team’s
state as winning firms (losing firms). Winning teams are listed first, and favored teams are italicized. Years
1991 and 1995 are omitted due to same-state Super Bowl contenders (i.e., NY and CA, respectively).
Data come from public Internet sources such as www.nfl.com and CRSP.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Firm Characteristics.
Panel A: Firm Characteristics of Winning Firms
Variable N Mean Median SD 5th 25th 75th 95th
LOGSIZE 10,412 4.71 4.49 2.24 1.38 3.11 6.16 8.70
MA/BA 9,119 2.06 1.29 4.64 0.72 0.97 1.99 5.02
LEVERAGE 10,260 0.25 0.20 0.29 0.000 0.06 0.37 0.64
ASSET TANG 10,286 0.29 0.22 0.25 0.01 0.08 0.42 0.81
RTE 10,249 0.18 0.12 1.98 1.78 0.05 0.31 0.58
TE 10,395 0.45 0.47 0.43 0.05 0.29 0.66 0.87
ROA 9,394 0.07 0.12 0.50 0.32 0.04 0.18 0.30
CASH 9,470 0.16 0.07 0.20 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.63
Panel B: Firm Characteristics of Losing Firms
Variable N Mean Median SD 5th 25th 75th 95th
LOGSIZE 8,191 4.92 4.76 2.28 1.40 3.30 6.44 8.85
MA/BA 7,000 1.93 1.23 2.86 0.69 0.94 1.93 5.06
LEVERAGE 8,079 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.00 0.05 0.37 0.65
ASSET TANG 8,060 0.26 0.20 0.24 0.01 0.06 0.39 0.77
RTE 8,090 0.31 0.10 2.26 2.42 0.10 0.30 0.59
TE 8,181 0.44 0.45 0.33 0.05 0.27 0.65 0.88
ROA 7,223 0.05 0.11 0.49 0.37 0.03 0.17 0.28
CASH 7,309 0.17 0.07 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.70
Panel C: Firm Characteristics of Favored Firms
Variable N Mean Median SD 5th 25th 75th 95th
LOGSIZE 9,919 4.77 4.59 2.20 1.39 3.20 6.24 8.63
MA/BA 8,689 1.92 1.26 2.88 0.71 0.96 1.92 4.81
LEVERAGE 9,788 0.24 0.20 0.30 0.00 0.05 0.37 0.64
ASSET TANG 9,802 0.29 0.22 0.25 0.01 0.08 0.43 0.81
RTE 9,763 0.31 0.11 2.48 2.23 0.09 0.30 0.58
TE 9,912 0.45 0.47 0.45 0.05 0.29 0.67 0.88
ROA 8,972 0.06 0.11 0.42 0.34 0.04 0.17 0.29
CASH 9,037 0.17 0.08 0.21 0.00 0.03 0.23 0.67
Panel D: Firm characteristics of nonfavored firms
Variable N Mean Median SD 5th 25th 75th 95th
LOGSIZE 8,684 4.84 4.62 2.32 1.37 3.16 6.36 8.94
MA/BA 7,430 2.10 1.27 4.94 0.71 0.95 2.01 5.25
LEVERAGE 8,551 0.25 0.21 0.24 0.00 0.06 0.38 0.65
ASSET TANG 8,544 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.01 0.07 0.39 0.77
(continued)
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First, the firms in the winning and losing states may have risk characteristics that are
different from the S&P 500, which the unadjusted returns do not capture. Second, the
Super Bowl occurs in late January or early February every year, leading to some
potential seasonal (e.g., January) effects in returns. Third, measuring abnormal
returns also helps control for potential systematic differences among our
subsamples.
Risk-adjusted returns are computed using a conventional four-factor
model, which include the Fama and French (1993) risk factors augmented
with the Carhart (1997) momentum factor.9 This factor model is shown in
Equation 1.
Ri;t ¼ ai þ bi;MKT MKTt þ bi;SMBSMBþ bi;HMLHMLþ bi;MOMMOM þ ei;t: ð1Þ
For each relevant local stock, we estimate stock-specific factor bs using daily
returns over a 255-day ‘‘estimation period’’ window that ends 46 days prior to each
respective Super Bowl. These firm-specific b estimates allow us to generate a set
expected returns adjusting for these common risk factors. We calculate abnormal
returns as the difference between these expected returns and the actual values. The
abnormal return (or prediction error) for the common stock of firm i on day t is
defined in Equation 2.
Ai;t ¼ Ri;t  ða^i þ b^i;MKTMKTt þ b^i;SMBSMBt þ b^i;HMLHMLt þ b^i;MOMMOMtÞ:
ð2Þ
Table 2. (continued)
Panel D: Firm characteristics of nonfavored firms
Variable N Mean Median SD 5th 25th 75th 95th
RTE 8,576 0.16 0.12 1.59 1.65 0.05 0.31 0.59
TE 8,664 0.44 0.45 0.31 0.05 0.27 0.64 0.88
ROA 7,645 0.06 0.11 0.57 0.33 0.04 0.17 0.29
CASH 7,742 0.16 0.07 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.65
Note. This table shows the firm characteristics for the event study around every Super Bowl from 1967 to
2010. Panel A and B show the descriptive statistics for winning states’ firms and losing states’ firms,
respectively. Panels C and D show the descriptive statistics for the favored states’ firms and nonfavored
states’ firms, respectively. LOGSIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value assets (TA) in million U.S.
dollar. MA/BA is the market-to-book ratio calculated as the market value of equity (product of PRCC_C
and CSHO) plus the book value of assets (AT) minus the book value of equity, all divided by the book
value of assets. The book value of equity is calculated as book assets (AT) minus book liabilities (LT) minus
preferred stock plus deferred taxes (TXDITC). And preferred stock equals the liquidation value (PSTKL)
if not missing, or redemption value (PSTKRV) if not missing, or the carrying value (PSTK). LEVERAGE is the
sum of short-term (DLC) and long-term (DLTT) debt divided by assets (AT). ASSET TANGIBILITY is net
property, plant and equipment (PPENT) scaled by assets (AT). RTE is retained earnings (RE) scaled by the
TA. TE is the shareholders’ equity (CEQ) scaled by the book value of assets (AT). ROA is EBITDA
(EBITDA) scaled by the TA. CASH is the cash and short-term investments balance (CHE) scaled by the TA.
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The coefficients, a^i , b^i;MKT , b^i;SMB, b^i;HML, and b^i;MOM , are OLS estimates of ai,
bi;MKT , bi;SMB, bi;HML, and bi;HML. The average (mean) abnormal return, AARt, is the
sample mean as defined in Equation 3, where t is the trading day relative to the event
(i.e., post-Super Bowl Monday) date.
AARt ¼
XN
i¼1Ai;t
N
: ð3Þ
These calculations occur daily over the 19-day study window that includes the
periods 9 days prior to the event, the event date, and 9 days after the event date. Day
0 is the Monday after the Super Bowl. We then aggregate these abnormal returns
across the 1967–2010 sample period for a total of 18,603 firm years for days 9 to
þ9. The cumulative average abnormal return, CAART1;T2, is defined over an interval
starting on day T1 and ending on day T2, as defined in Equation 4.
10
CAART1;T2 ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1
XT2
t¼T1Ai;t: ð4Þ
We correct for the potential problem of cross correlation of security returns
using Brown and Warner (1980) and report their portfolio time-series t-statistic
(CDA).11 We also report a generalized sign Z-statistic (Cowan, 1992), which
compares the proportion of positive abnormal returns around our event to the
proportion from a period unaffected by the event (i.e., our estimation period).
For examples of the generalized sign test in the literature, see Sanger and
Peterson (1990), Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991), and Chen, Hu, and Shieh
(1991).
To test the mean differences between individual groups and periods, we employ
two approaches. First, we employ two-group tests of means, using either the paired
two-sample test of means to compare cumulative returns of the prior (9, 1) and
post (0, þ9) periods or the Satterthwaite unequal variance independent two-sample
t-test of means to compare cumulative differences within and across groups. The
second approach is a regression of cumulative returns on either a period dummy to
compare cumulative returns of the prior (9,1) and post (0,þ9) periods or a group
membership dummy variable to compare cumulative returns of different groups. The
standard errors are corrected using White–Huber’s heteroskedasticity consistent
estimator. The results of these two tests were qualitatively the same in every case,
quantitatively identical in many cases, and statistically significant at the same levels
(i.e., 1%, 5%, and 10%) in every respective case.
Unadjusted Daily Returns Around the Super Bowl
Figure 1 shows the raw returns to holding all the locally headquartered Super Bowl
firms during the 9 days prior to the Super Bowl (9, 0), the Monday after the Super
Bowl (i.e., day 0), and the 9 subsequent trading days (þ1, þ9). Additionally, it
shows the average raw returns to holding the subsamples of favored, nonfavored,
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winning, and losing states’ firms. For simple benchmarking purposes, we also show
the average S&P 500 returns during the 19-day study window. While it is obviously
not possible ex ante to identify the winning and losing firms as it is with the favored
and nonfavored firms, we present all results for completeness. Table 3 reports the
corresponding numerical data.12
Figure 1 indicates substantially increasing daily returns to firms headquartered
near Super Bowl contenders across the entire 19-day window. These returns are
generally increasing for the entire sample and all subsamples, and they appear to
outpace the S&P 500 significantly. Table 3 confirms these results, showing cumu-
lative returns over the pre-event (9,1), postevent (0,þ9) and the whole (9,þ9)
window. The difference between the pre- and postevent returns is quantified using
two-tailed t-tests to determine statistical significance. Holding a portfolio of all local
Super Bowl firms has yielded an average return of 4.16% during the 19-day trading
period around the Super Bowl, which annualizes to around 55%.13 Holding only the
favored (nonfavored) firms slightly increases (decreases) the return to 4.32 (3.99) %
or approximately 57 (53) % annualized. The pre-event returns differ from
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Figure 1. Cumulative raw returns around National Football League Super Bowl events for
firms headquartered in favored states, nonfavored states, losing states, winning states, and the
Standard and Poor (S&P) 500. This figure shows the close-to-close cumulative average raw
returns for all firms headquartered in states that house the favored, nonfavored, winning, and
losing Super Bowl teams. It also shows returns to the S&P’s 500 stock index. Returns are
measured daily for a 9 trading-day window around 42 Super Bowls between 1967 and 2010.
14 Journal of Sports Economics
postevent returns for the whole sample and for subsamples of nonfavored, win-
ning, and losing firms. Neither favored firms nor the S&P 500 have returns that
differ between the pre- and postevent periods. Winning and losing results are
comparable, and they show that knowing the Super Bowl outcome is not critical
to formulating a profitable trading strategy. In fact, publicly available ex ante
betting information provides the highest average historical return with a long
position in favored teams’ firms.
While not necessarily riskless, a zero net investment portfolio long in the subject
firms and short in the S&P 500 also performed well, on average, over the past four
Table 3. Cumulative Raw Returns Around National Football League Super Bowl Events for
Firms Headquartered in Losing, Winning, Favored, and Nonfavored States and the Standard
and Poor (S&P) 500.
Cumulative Raw Return (Daily)
Portfolios
Prior
(9, 1)
Post
(0, þ9)
Whole
(9, þ9)
Difference
(Prior  Post)
(1) All firms (N ¼ 18,603) 2.61*** 1.55*** 4.16*** 1.06***
(2) Favored (n ¼ 9,919) 2.11*** 2.21*** 4.32*** 0.10
(3) Nonfavored (n ¼ 8,684) 3.21*** 0.79 3.99*** 2.42***
(4) Winning (n ¼ 10,412) 2.45*** 1.71*** 4.16*** 0.73***
(5) Losing (n ¼ 8,191) 2.85*** 1.34*** 4.18*** 1.51***
(6) S&P 500 (n ¼ 42) 0.43 0.73* 1.15 0.30
(2)  (3) 1.10*** 1.42*** 0.33
(4)  (5) 0.40** 0.37** 0.02
(1)  (6) 2.19*** 0.83** 3.01***
(2)  (6) 1.68*** 1.49*** 3.17***
(3)  (6) 2.78*** 0.07 2.84***
(4)  (6) 2.02*** 0.99** 3.01***
(5)  (6) 2.42*** 0.62** 3.03***
Note. This table shows the cumulative raw returns for all firms headquartered in states that house the
favored, nonfavored, winning, and losing Super Bowl teams along with returns to the US S&P 500 index.
Returns are measured daily for a 9 trading-day window before and after 42 Super Bowls between 1967
and 2010. The columns (prior, post, and whole) show the cumulative mean unadjusted (raw) returns for
all firms headquartered in states that house the losing, winning, favored, and nonfavored Super Bowl
teams for various windows around the Super Bowl, which occurs on the Sunday prior to trading day 0.
The final column shows the difference between the cumulative daily returns over the prior (9, 1) and
post (0, þ9) windows. Tests for significance include both a paired two-sample test of means and a
regression of cumulative unadjusted returns of the post-period returns on prior-period returns using a
dummy variable to indicate whether the returns were from the post period. The standard errors in this
regression are corrected using White–Huber’s heteroskedasticity consistent estimator. Both methods
yielded quantitatively similar results for differences and identical results for statistical significance. We
report the paired sample values for ease of interpretation. The rows at bottom depict tests of mean
results for the cumulative unadjusted returns between different groups, to include the S&P 500. All values
are in percentages.
***, **, * Indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels.
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decades. Such a portfolio long in all firms yielded an average of 3.01% (see (1)–(6)
for the ‘‘whole’’ period). If odds makers’ data are available and accurate beginning
after the play-off game, then Figure 1 and Table 3, Panel A, show the returns to a
portfolio long in favored (nonfavored) teams’ firms and short in the S&P 500 has
yielded 3.17 (2.84)% over this 19-day trading window.
Table 4 begins to explore the risk associated with the returns in Panel A. If the
large returns in Panel A represent compensation for bearing large risk, then one
might expect to observe relatively frequent negative return realizations as a mani-
festation of that risk. This does not appear to be the case. Specifically, Table 4
summarizes the results of a long–short strategy when subdividing the entire sample
into its 42 annual events. Over the 42 years studied, firms in close proximity to the
Super Bowl outperform the index average frequently. The last column shows that a
zero net investment portfolio long in all firms and short in the S&P 500 yielded
positive returns in 35 of the 42 years; returns were positive in 33 of the 42 years
Table 4. Annual Ex Post Raw Return Summary for a Zero Net Investment Portfolio of a Long
Position in Firms Headquartered Near Super Bowl Contending Teams and a Short Position in
the Standard and Poor (S&P) 500.
Portfolio Consisting of Short Position in S&P 500 and Long
Position in:
Prior 9
to 1
Post 0
to þ9
Whole 9
to þ9
All firms (# years positive of 42-year sample) 33 27 35
Worst year (%) 1.76 3.40 2.98
Best year (%) 13.22 5.51 16.43
Favored 32 28 33
Worst year (%) 3.86 2.59 4.18
Best year (%) 13.45 6.03 17.86
Nonfavored 34 26 33
Worst year (%) 1.13 3.48 2.87
Best year (%) 12.87 5.58 14.28
Winning 33 28 34
Worst year (%) 2.22 3.48 2.87
Best year (%) 13.45 6.03 17.86
Losing 33 26 32
Worst year (%) 3.86 2.59 4.19
Best year (%) 12.87 5.58 14.28
Note. This table summarizes the ex post annual return performance relative to the S&P 500 of portfolios
consisting of firms headquartered near teams competing in the Super Bowl. It shows annual portfolio
performance for the superset and subsets (i.e., favored, nonfavored, winning, and losing) of these firms
during a 19-day window around 42 Super Bowls occurring annually between 1967 and 2010. The 19-day
study window is broken down into a 9-day period prior to the Super Bowl, 10-day period after the Super
Bowl, and the whole 19-day period. The first measure for each set of firms shows how many years the
portfolio has higher returns than the S&P 500. Worst (best) year shows the lowest (highest) return for
any year when holding a portfolio with a long position in locally headquartered stocks and a short position
in the S&P 500. Since winning/losing firms are not known prior to the Super Bowl, this table only shows
post-Super Bowl results for these firms. All values are in percentages.
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when having a long position in either favored or nonfavored firms. Furthermore,
these annual results are positively skewed with the best year for such a portfolio of
all/favored/nonfavored firms yielding 16.43%/17.68%/14.28%. The worst single
year yielded 2.98%/4.18%/2.87%, respectively. Thus, undertaking a long–
short strategy has not proven excessively risky, offering the potential for positive
returns in approximately 5 of every 6 years, with the most extreme positive returns
greatly outweighing the most extreme negative returns. In all, these results suggest
that a simple strategy of trading on odds makers’ information is approximately
equivalent to using a perfect foresight trading strategy based on the actual winning
and losing teams.
Abnormal Returns for Firms in Winning, Losing, Favored,
and Nonfavored States
Formal risk adjustment clearly requires a more established method, so all results
going forward include abnormal returns from the four-factor model described ear-
lier. We begin this section by confirming our results generally support prior studies.
Since our hypothesis is that sentiment is not solely reactionary but also anticipatory,
we then extend the literature by widening the study window and exploring the
possibility of such anticipatory sentiment as well as postevent drift. To do so, we
examine pre- and postevent abnormal returns for winning, losing, favored, and
nonfavored states’ firms.
With respect to the prior literature that primarily analyzes reactionary sentiments,
the post-Super Bowl daily return behavior generally supports these findings. The
results for the day immediately after the Super Bowl (i.e., day 0) are generally con-
sistent with previous studies.14 We find a negatively signed abnormal return of
0.06% on the day after the Super Bowl for losing states’ firms and zero return for
winning states’ firms, which supports the Edmans et al.’s (2007) finding of an asym-
metric loss effect.15 The statistically insignificant (i.e., two-tailed p value of .174) loss
effect in our data is less pronounced than in other studies, most likely due to sample
differences. For instance, related prior studies define local firms by drawing a radius
around the city of interest (e.g., Chang, Chen, Chou, & Lin, 2012), whereas we use all
firms within a team’s home state. Beyond the immediate reaction effect, the individual
daily returns for winning and losing firms after the Super Bowl begin to show the
anticipation effect given the preponderance of significant positive daily returns lead-
ing up to the Super Bowl compared to their frequency after the game.
To investigate our hypothesis regarding anticipatory sentiment, we compare firm
performance before and after the Super Bowl. Again, we limit our pregame window
to the 9 trading days before the Super Bowl, eliminating the price impact from the
first trading day following the previous play-off game. Limiting the sample to
winning or losing firms evaluates pre-event performance by subdividing the sample
based solely on the actual Super Bowl outcome, which is information known only ex
post. Because abundant pre-event information exists such as injury reports, weather
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forecasts, game location, and so on, it is necessary to account for this information
when considering any anticipation effect. A large wagering market exists to account
for these pre-event variables and places odds on the game outcome.16 We incorpo-
rate the information from this wagering market in our tests. Instead of only sub-
dividing the sample by the game outcome (i.e., winning or losing), as before, we
treat betting odds as a proxy for all other potentially valuable information in pre-
dicting a Super Bowl winner and also subdivide the sample into the two other
groups: Firms geographically associated with the favored or nonfavored team lead-
ing up to the Super Bowl game.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative abnormal return results and tabulated statistics for
the period spanning 9 days prior to the Super Bowl, postgame Monday, and the
subsequent 9 trading days after the Super Bowl. The plots indicate that the daily
abnormal return behavior for the subject stocks changes around Super Bowl Sunday
for all subcategories of teams’ firms. The Super Bowl results and the pregame
favored status appear highly correlated—favored (nonfavored) and winning (losing)
teams appear to move closely together. Interestingly, the actual winning and losing
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Figure 2. Cumulative abnormal returns around National Football League Super Bowl events
for firms headquartered in winning, losing, favored, and nonfavored states. This figure shows
the close-to-close value-weighted cumulative average abnormal return for all firms head-
quartered in states that house the winning, losing, favored, and nonfavored Super Bowl teams.
Returns are measured daily for a 9 trading-day window around 42 Super Bowls between 1967
and 2010. Abnormal returns come from a four-factor model with 252-day estimation period
that ends 46 days prior to the Super Bowl event.
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portfolios have slightly more extreme returns, which is because the postgame results
for favored and nonfavored firms include the ‘‘surprise’’ games (i.e., favored teams
losing and nonfavored teams winning), whereas the winning/losing contains only the
winning and losing firms.
Table 5 quantifies these CAARs, analogous to the cumulative raw returns in
Table 3. Across the whole sample and for every subsample of winning, losing,
favored, and nonfavored firms, the CAARs are significantly positive in the period
before the Super Bowl (9, 1) as well as across the whole time period under study
(9, þ9). The first column in the cumulative returns section of Table 5 contains one
of the major results in our study: Pregame returns are significant for all teams,
regardless of favored status or actual outcome, which is consistent with the hypothe-
sized ‘‘anticipation effect.’’ Coupled with prior findings, these results suggest a
bidding up in locally headquartered firms’ prices for the 2 weeks prior to their local
team’s participation in the Super Bowl. On the contrary, cumulative returns in the
post (0, þ9) period are only significant for winning and favored teams.
Table 5. Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around National Football League Super Bowl Events
for Firms Headquartered in Losing, Winning, Favored, and Nonfavored States.
Cumulative Abnormal Return (Daily)
Portfolios
Prior
(9, 1)
Post
(0, þ9)
Whole
(9, þ9)
Difference
(Prior  Post)
All firms (N ¼ 18,603) 0.95*** 0.19 1.14*** 0.76***
Favored (n ¼ 9,919) 0.95*** 0.40** 1.35*** 0.55***
Nonfavored (n ¼ 8,684) 0.98*** 0.07 0.91*** 1.05***
Winning (n ¼ 10,412) 1.03*** 0.33** 1.36*** 0.70***
Losing (n ¼ 8,191) 0.87*** 0.00 0. 87*** 0.87***
Favored–nonfavored 0.03 0.47*** 0.44*
Winning–losing 0.16 0.33* 0.49**
Note. This table shows the cumulative average abnormal returns for all firms headquartered in states that
house the favored, nonfavored, winning, and losing Super Bowl teams. Abnormal returns come from a
four-factor model with 252-day estimation period that ends 46 days prior to the Super Bowl event.
Returns are measured daily for a 9 trading-day window before and after 42 Super Bowls between 1967
and 2010. The columns (prior, post, and whole) show the cumulative mean abnormal returns for all firms
headquartered in states that house the losing, winning, favored, and nonfavored Super Bowl teams for
various windows around the Super Bowl, which occurs on the Sunday prior to trading day 0. The final
column shows the difference between the cumulative daily returns over the prior (9, 1) and post
(0,þ9) windows. Tests for significance include both a paired two-sample test of means and a regression of
cumulative unadjusted returns of the post-period returns on prior period returns using a dummy variable
to indicate whether the returns were from the post period. The standard errors in this regression are
corrected using White–Huber’s heteroskedasticity consistent estimator. Both methods yielded quanti-
tatively similar results for differences and identical results for statistical significance. We report the paired
sample values for ease of interpretation. The rows at bottom depict tests of means results for the
cumulative unadjusted returns between different groups. All values are in percentages.
***, **, * Indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels.
Payne et al. 19
Further supporting the anticipatory sentiment argument, the CAARs in the period
prior to the Super Bowl are significantly higher than for the period after the Super
Bowl in every single case. Winning, losing, favored, and nonfavored firms accumu-
late postevent returns that are 0.70%, 0.87%, 0.55%, and 1.05% lower, respectively,
than their pre-event counterparts. If any pre-Super Bowl return behavior simply
represents reaction to the play-off wins 2 weeks before, then one would expect the
post-Super Bowl reaction to be stronger than the postplay-off (i.e., pre-Super Bowl)
reaction. As we know from Edmans et al. (2007), more significant games yield
stronger return reactions. One of the novel findings of this study is that despite the
immediate loss effect and lack of winning effect, once we lengthen the post-Super
Bowl period, winning states’ firms outperform losing states’ firms in the post-Super
Bowl period.
Taken together, the results for abnormal returns are consistent with prior findings
of immediate winning and losing effects, present evidence that splitting the sample
based on a team’s favored/nonfavored status yields analogous results to winning/
losing, and also present novel evidence of a pregame anticipation effect as well as
postgame drift.
So far, the evidence shows that stocks of firms in winning, losing, favored, and
nonfavored states have positive raw and abnormal returns during the 2 weeks prior to
the Super Bowl. When we expand the investigation window, the evidence indicates
that abnormal returns to winning/favored (losing/nonfavored) states’ firms drift
upward (remain level) in the weeks after the Super Bowl victory and these winning
(favored) states’ firms have higher abnormal returns than losing (nonfavored) states’
firms across the entire window. These conclusions support the hypothesis that sport-
induced sentiment affects stock returns, the sentiment is not only reactive but antici-
patory, and that the full effect of sentiment on prices is not concentrated immediately
around the Super Bowl game. These conclusions lead to the question of whether
pregame investor sentiment is correlated with the Super Bowl outcome. More spe-
cifically, does pregame sentiment offer any incremental information beyond that
already contained in the well-known public information from odds makers? The next
section tests whether investors exhibit this type of ‘‘informed anticipation.’’
Tests of Informed Anticipation
The supposition behind our next test is that if investors have information about the
game outcome beyond that already contained in publicly available betting odds, then
pregame returns will be correlated with both the favored status and the actual game
outcome. In particular, we want to test whether investors accurately predict out-
comes that both accord with and counter the odds makers’ publicly available
predictions.
Figure 3 and Table 6 report returns when we subdivide the sample into four
categories: favored teams that win (favored/winning), nonfavored teams that lose
(nonfavored/losing), nonfavored teams that win (nonfavored/winning), and favored
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teams that lose (favored/losing).17 The plot shows a rather monotonic relationship
among the cumulative returns across these four categories during the pre-event
phase. That is, firms linked to favored teams that win are bid up more quickly
(i.e., have higher cumulative returns) than nonfavored teams, which are in turn bid
up more rapidly than favored teams that lose.
If investors possess perfect foresight then among winning (losing) teams,
the pregame returns should be the same regardless of favored status. Looking
at the cumulative returns in Table 6, however, the differences (1)  (3)
(favored/winning  nonfavored/winning) and (2)  (4) (nonfavored losing 
favored/losing) indicate that pregame returns depend upon more than just the
actual outcome: Pregame returns are correlated with pre-Super Bowl odds. So,
either investors do not possess incremental information beyond the odds or there
exists an anticipation effect that affects all firms, obscuring our ability to
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Figure 3. Cumulative abnormal returns around National Football League Super Bowl events
for firms headquartered in favored and nonfavored states conditioned on whether the firm is
in a losing or winning state. This figure shows the close-to-close value-weighted cumulative
average abnormal return for all firms headquartered in states that house all combinations of
the favored/nonfavored and winning/losing Super Bowl teams. Returns are measured daily for
a 9 trading-day window around 42 Super Bowls between 1967 and 2010. Abnormal returns
come from a four-factor model with 252-day estimation period that ends 46 days prior to the
Super Bowl event.
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measure investors’ incremental information. If there is an anticipation effect,
then pregame returns are affected not only by the odds of winning but also by
this more general anticipatory effect, so this test may not have much power.
We now describe an alternative way to test whether investors have additional
information. If investors possess information beyond that contained in publicly
available betting odds, then among favored teams, winning teams should have
higher pregame returns than losing teams; among nonfavored teams, winning teams
should also have higher pregame returns than losing teams. For nonfavored teams,
the difference (2)  (3) shows that even though nonfavored losing firms outperform
nonfavored winning firms, the difference is not significant. On the other hand,
favored teams that lose do indeed have smaller pregame returns than favored teams
that win (i.e., difference (1) (4)), and these favored teams that lose have negatively
Table 6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around National Football League Super Bowl Events
for Firms Headquartered in Losing,Winning, Favored, and Nonfavored States Conditioned on
whether the Firm is in a Losing or Winning State.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (Daily)
Portfolios
Prior
(9, 1)
Post
(0, þ9)
Whole
(9, þ9)
Difference
(Prior – Post)
(1) Favored/winning (n ¼ 7,906) 1.09*** 0.56*** 1.65*** 0.53***
(2) Nonfavored/losing (n ¼ 6,176) 1.03*** 0.06 1.09*** 0.97***
(3) Nonfavored/winning (n ¼ 2,508) 0.86*** 0.40* 0.47 1.26***
(4) Favored/losing (n ¼ 2,013) 0.39 0.21 0.18 0.60
(1)  (3) 0.23 0.96*** 1.18***
(2)  (4) 0.64* 0.27 0.91**
(2)  (3) 0.17 0.46* 0.62
(1)  (4) 0.70*** 0.77** 1.47***
(1)  (2) 0.06 0.50** 0.56*
(3)  (4) 0.47* 0.19 0.29
Note. This table shows the cumulative average abnormal returns for all firms headquartered in states that
house the combinations of nonfavored/favored and winning/losing Super Bowl teams. Abnormal returns
come from a four-factor model with 252-day estimation period that ends 46 days prior to the Super Bowl
event. Returns are measured daily for a 9 trading-day window before and after 42 Super Bowls between
1967 and 2010. The columns (prior, post, and whole) show the cumulative mean abnormal returns for all
firms headquartered in states that house the losing, winning, favored, and nonfavored Super Bowl teams
for various windows around the Super Bowl, which occurs on the Sunday prior to trading day 0. The final
column shows the difference between the cumulative daily returns over the prior (9, 1) and post (0,
þ9) windows. Tests for significance include both a paired two-sample test of means and a regression of
cumulative unadjusted returns of the post-period returns on prior period returns using a dummy variable
to indicate whether the returns were from the post period. The standard errors in this regression are
corrected using White–Huber’s heteroskedasticity consistent estimator. Both methods yielded quanti-
tatively similar results for differences and identical results for statistical significance. We report the paired
sample values for ease of interpretation. The rows at bottom depict tests of means results for the
cumulative unadjusted returns between different groups. All values are in percentages.
***, **, * Indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels.
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signed postgame returns. This result indicates that investors may ‘‘sense’’ correctly
the favored teams that will likely lose versus the ones that will win, and they
consequently do not bid up the prices as much. Nevertheless, the evidence on this
is mixed and must be interpreted with care.
Overall, the postevent results in this subdivision of the sample provide evidence
that supports prior findings and generates further questions. Like Palomino et al.
(2009), we find that investors react strongly to an expected win (i.e., favored/win-
ning exhibits upward drift), although as discussed earlier in this article, this average
0.56% cumulative abnormal return is significantly smaller in magnitude than the
pre-event run-up in prices, which accumulates to 1.09%. Also, for favored/losing
firms, the significantly lower cumulative returns in the postevent period are some-
what consistent with the idea that even though investors correctly anticipated a loss,
they still exhibited the loss effect documented in prior literature. We expand this
prior finding by noting this loss effect is not limited to the day immediately after the
Super Bowl but drifts downward for some time.
Other results raise further questions. Specifically, there is scant evidence of
a ‘‘surprised’’ reaction to an unanticipated postevent outcome. One might
expect abnormally low returns for favored teams that lose and abnormally high
returns for nonfavored teams that win due to an unanticipated outcome, at least
according to odds makers’ predictions. There is weak evidence for the former,
as previously discussed, and no evidence for the latter of these predictions. In
fact, the most puzzling result involves nonfavored teams that win. The firms
associated with these teams experience positive cumulative abnormal returns
prior to the Super Bowl of 0.86%, yet they experience negative abnormal
returns of 0.40% after the unexpected victory. Nevertheless, this anticipation
and letdown result has been documented elsewhere in the literature and is
consistent with Bernile and Lyandres’s (2011) finding of negative returns after
a victory.
Robustness Analysis
Barber and Odean (2008) and Kumar (2009) document systematic differences in the
buying behavior of individual versus institutional investors. Individual investors are,
in general, more prone to behavioral biases. Individual investors also tend to invest
more heavily in small capitalization stocks, whereas the largest firms tend to have
the highest institutional ownership (see Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Duggal & Millnar,
1999). If the observed pregame returns are attributable to investor biases, we
hypothesize that they will be most pronounced among the smallest firms. Therefore,
we rerun our results by dividing the firms in our sample into size quintiles.18 Not
only are the results strongest among the smaller firms in our sample, but the abnor-
mal returns decrease nearly monotonically with firm size. Returns are statistically
significant in all size quintiles among winning firms, but among the other firm
categories, the abnormal returns are statistically insignificant in the largest two size
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quintiles. These results are consistent with the explanation that pregame abnormal
returns are driven by biases, especially among local, individual investors.
Another concern about these results involves the unique sample under study.
Despite controlling for risk in the returns, it is possible the firms in states home to
Super Bowl contending teams differ systematically in ways the standard four-factor
risk model does not capture. To address this concern, we create a year-by-year
matched sample of non-Super Bowl contending firms and evaluate their concurrent
risk-adjusted performance.
If the return performance shown earlier for Super Bowl competing firms is not
possibly related to local fan sentiment, then there ought to be no difference in CARs
for the treatment and matched samples. Or, if there is not any anticipatory phenom-
enon occurring for Super Bowl vicinity firms, then the returns to the matched sample
could outpace the treatment group in the pre-event period. If, however, any antici-
patory sentiment exists, then CARs for the treatment sample should outpace those of
the matched sample before the Super Bowl.
In every subsample, the treatment firms exhibit significantly higher mean CARs
than the matched firms in the pre-event period. The average outperformance ranges
from 39 bps (losing) to 53 bps (winning), and all differences are significant at
conventional levels. As for the postevent period, while not statistically different,
the point estimates at least suggest a winning and losing effect since the treatment
group has higher (lower) mean CARs in the 10 days following the Super Bowl after a
winning (losing) outcome. For the winning and favored subsamples, the higher mean
CARs for the treatment group in the pre-event period, coupled with point estimate
outperformance in the post-event period, lead to statistically higher mean CARs for
the treatment groups than the matched samples across the entire event window.
In summary, a matched sample analysis supports this novel finding of an antici-
patory effect for Super Bowl proximate firms. Using a matched sample that exhibits
the same industries and very similar firm characteristics as the treatment sample,
mean CARs for the treatment sample are higher in the pre-Super Bowl period than
they are for the matched sample.
Conclusions
This study examines the connection between investor sentiment and stock returns by
analyzing the performance of local sport teams and local stock returns. Specifically,
we test the hypothesis that mood affects stock returns in the United States by
examining the effect of a Super Bowl contest on the stock returns of firms that are
geographically associated with the competing teams. One contribution of our study
is the documentation of ‘‘anticipatory sentiment’’ among investors. We use a wider
time window, both before and after the Super Bowl, than most of the other studies in
this area and find that investor sentiment does not begin only after the Super Bowl is
over; instead, sentiment also occurs in anticipation of the game itself. In particular,
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we document significantly positive abnormal returns in local stocks prior to the
Super Bowl. These abnormal returns are larger than those that occur after the Super
Bowl, and they occur for firms associated with both competing teams. Our study is
the first in the sports study literature to document such anticipatory sentiment.
We also analyze abnormal returns by splitting teams based on their favored
status, which is the first time this has been done in a study of stock price reactions
to the Super Bowl. Because favored teams usually win, a team’s favored status is
highly correlated with the actual outcome of the game. The pregame returns are
positive, significant, and nearly identical for both favored and nonfavored teams,
which are consistent with an anticipatory ‘‘euphoria’’ among investors. Postgame
returns are positive and significant for favored teams (again, because they usually
win), and negative and insignificant for losing teams.
The pregame price run-up is largest for favored teams that ultimately win, which
is consistent with the favored status containing information about the eventual
outcome that investors use to inform their trades. In particular, it appears that
investors correctly anticipate when a favored team will lose. The postgame price
responses are more nuanced: Favored teams that win exhibit positive post-Super
Bowl returns, favored teams that lose exhibit negative post-Super Bowl returns, and
win or lose, nonfavored teams exhibit neutral or negative post Super-Bowl returns.
When we interact the actual outcome of the game with each team’s favored status,
we find modest postgame returns except when the favored team wins. These results
corroborate those reported in Palomino et al. (2009) in which investors react only to
a strongly expected win, and like those authors we suggest that the observed asym-
metry is difficult to reconcile with rational investor behavior.
We perform two robustness tests to bolster these findings. First, since our tests rely
on local investors moving local firms’ stock prices, we separate the sample of firms
into size quintiles. Prior studies have found smaller firms experience more individual
ownership. In support of our overall findings, the smallest quintile of firms experi-
ences the largest anticipatory effect. Additionally, we perform a matched sample
analysis and conclude that a portfolio of firms with similar characteristics to our
sample firms does not exhibit the same degree of anticipatory return behavior.
Finally, the data suggest a viable trading strategy around the Super Bowl involving
a zero net investment portfolio consisting of a long position in all firms headquartered
in competing teams’ states and a short position in the S&P 500. Such a strategy has
yielded an average return of 3.01% across the 19 trading-day window and has been
profitable in 33 of the 42 years. Alternatively, using odds makers’ information, cre-
ating a portfolio long in favored (nonfavored) states’ firms and short in the S&P 500
has yielded an average return of 3.17 (2.84) % over the same period. Interestingly, a
team’s favored status forms the basis of a trading strategy that is more profitable than
the one based upon the actual (ex ante unknown) outcome of the game. In sum, the
evidence here suggests trading in firms headquartered near the competing teams
before and after the Super Bowl is generally a winning strategy. Standing on the
sidelines is the only sure way for investors to avoid winning this game.
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Notes
1. We follow the methodology of Giannetti and Wang (2016) and proxy local firms by
identifying all firms headquartered in the same state as the competing Super Bowl team.
2. Chen and Chen (2012) document significant abnormal stock returns for the companies
that owned Japanese professional baseball teams when those teams qualified for the final
championship series and attributed this to the marketing of the baseball teams. In contrast,
our focus is on the returns of firms whose only connection with the professional football
team is geographic proximity.
3. Specifically, we use a horizon of 9 trading days prior to the Super Bowl. Teams qualify
for the Super Bowl by winning a play-off game 2 weeks (10 trading days) before the
Super Bowl. In light of the results of Chang et al. (2012), we exclude the returns from the
day following each team’s win in the play-off game thus eliminating returns that may
capture investor response to the play-off game, and not anticipation of the Super Bowl.
4. Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2003) study daylight, Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) look
at sunlight, Cao and Wei (2005) investigate temperature, Yuan, Zheng, and Zhu (2006)
focus on lunar cycles, Kelly and Meschke (2010) study the Seasonal Affective Disorder,
and Bialkowski et al. (2012) study the effects of the Ramadan holiday on investor
psychology and stock returns.
5. From a story published on February 9, 2016, in the Denver Post and accessed at http://
www.denverpost.com/news/ci_29494891/broncos-victory-celebration-will-wind-
through-crowded-denver
6. See French (1980) and Keim and Stambaugh (1984) for a discussion of the day of the
week effect.
7. Super Bowl favored and nonfavored data come from www.databasefootball.com/leagues/
superbowl.htm
8. This is a robustness test in itself, as it represents the weakest ‘‘home bias’’ link when
compared to other geographical connection measures such as the aforementioned zip
code or distance from focal point approaches. If the relationship does truly exist,
then this expansive variable should show a statistical connection. As in other similar
empirical papers, this study inevitably tests the joint hypothesis of whether there is a
statistical relationship between the event and stock returns and whether people asso-
ciate with the state they live in. For the reasons of the joint hypothesis, we selected
the geographical variable that represents the weakest link to present a stronger
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argument for our results. It is possible that some states’ residents are closer to the compet-
itor’s city than their own state’s city. A review of the sample cities shows this could really be
the case only in 2007, which represents less than 1% of the overall sample. Likewise, fan
bases can extend beyond a state’s borders; however, measuring individual preferences is
beyond our scope and serves as a potential improvement for future analyses.
9. In brief, these factors include the market risk premium, where the market is the value-
weighted market return in CRSP, the return difference between portfolios containing the
smallest decile of stocks and the largest decile of stocks across the market as measured by
size, the return difference between portfolios containing the highest decile of stocks and
lowest decile of stocks across the market as measured by the ratio of book equity-to-market
equity, and the return difference between portfolios containing the highest decile of stocks
and lowest decile of stocks across the market as measured by recent return (i.e., momentum).
10. We correct for the potential problem of cross correlation of security returns using Brown
and Warner (1980) and report their portfolio time-series t-statistic (CDA). We also report
a generalized sign Z-statistic (Cowan, 1992) that compares the proportion of positive
abnormal returns around our event to the proportion from a period unaffected by the event
(i.e., our estimation period). For examples of the generalized sign test in the literature, see
Sanger and Peterson (1990), Singh et al. (1991), and Chen et al. (1991).
11. For further application, see N. Dopuch, Robert W. Holthausen, R. Leftwich (1986),
Abnormal stock returns associated with media disclosures of ‘subject to’ qualified audit
opinions, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June), pp. 93-118. and
Brickley, James A., Dark, Frederick H. and Weisbach, Michael, (1991), An Agency
Perspective on Franchising, Financial Management, 20, issue 1.
12. An Online Appendix located at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/financefacpub/31 tabu-
lates the average daily returns over the (9, þ9) window that supports Table 3.
13. Although we report annualized figures, we present them solely for contextual purposes.
The purpose of this article is to report returns before and after the Super Bowl not to imply
any trading strategy is repeatable year round.
14. The Online Appendix located at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/financefacpub/31 tabu-
lates the average daily returns over the (9, þ9) window to support this point and further
discussion related to Table 5.
15. While there exists an extensive literature documenting asymmetric returns in response to
various types of information (see, e.g., Chan, 2003; Chulia, Martens, & van Dijk, 2010;
Kurov, 2010), studies by Akhtar, Faff, Oliver, and Subrahmanyam (2011) and Akhtar,
Faff, Oliver, and Subrahmanyam (2012) are among the first to document sentiment-based
asymmetry in returns, which they attribute to a ‘‘negativity’’ effect. Over a 1-day window,
we find a similar asymmetric effect on returns in response to a loss.
16. Breuer, Guido Hauten, and Kreuz (2009) study a new class of financial instruments
designed as lotteries on the outcome of highly visible sporting events. Such investments
give investors an alternative to direct betting using available bookmakers’ odds.
17. the Online Appendix located at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/financefacpub/31 tabu-
lates the average daily returns over the (–9, þ9) window to support this point and further
discussion related to Table 6.
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18. See Online Appendix located at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/financefacpub/31 for
tabulated values that support all robustness tests.
Supplemental Material
The online [appendices/data supplements/etc.] are available at http://journals.sagepub.com/
doi/suppl/10.1177/1527002516684170.
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